Abstract. Large classes of weak keys have been found for the block cipher algorithm IDEA, previously known as IPES ?]. IDEA has a 128-bit key and encrypts blocks of 64 bits. For a class of 2 23 keys IDEA exhibits a linear factor. For a certain class of 2 35 keys the cipher has a global characteristic with probability 1. For another class of 2 51 keys only two encryptions and solving a set of 16 nonlinear boolean equations with 12 variables is su cient to test if the used key belongs to this class. If it does, its particular value can be calculated e ciently. It is shown that the problem of weak keys can be eliminated by slightly modifying the key schedule of IDEA.
IDEA is an iterated cipher consisting of 8 similar rounds and a single output transformation. The building blocks of the round function are multiplication modulo 2 16 + 1, addition modulo 2 16 and bitwise XOR. IDEA has a 128-bit key and encrypts/decrypts data in blocks of 64 bits.
With exception of the key schedule, the IDEA decryption process is the same as its encryption process. The computational graph of the IDEA algorithm is shown in Fig.1 . The encryption round keys are 16-bit substrings of the global key as speci ed in Table 1 . The decryption round keys can be derived from the encryption round keys. ? ? 
Classes of Weak Keys yielding Linear Factors
The use of multiplicative subkeys with value 1 or ? 1 give rise to linear factors ?] in the round function. In the context of this paper a linear factor is a linear equation in key, input and output bits that holds for all possible inputs. The linear factors can be revealed by expressing the sum (modulo 2) of LSBs of the output subblocks of an IDEA round in terms of input and key bits.
As an example, we will express the XOR of the LSBs of the rst and second output subblock of a round: y 1 y 2 (with the indices denoting the subblock number). From 
If the key bits are considered as (albeit unknown) constants, this linear factor can be interpreted as the propagation of knowledge from x 1 x 3 to y 1 y 2 , denoted by (1; 0; 1; 0) ! (1; 1; 0; 0). Similar factors and their corresponding conditions on subkey blocks can be found for all 15 combinations of LSB output bits and are listed in Table 2 . Multiple-round linear factors can be found by combining linear factors where the involved intermediate terms cancel out. For every round this gives conditions on subkeys that can be converted to conditions on global key bits using Table   1 . An example is given in Table 3 to characteristics with probability 1 in the round function. A round is executed for a pair of inputs X and X with a given XOR X 0 = X X . Let be the 16-bit block 8000 (HEX), i.e. the MSB is 1 and all other bits are 0.
Suppose X and X only di er in the MSB bit of the 4-th subblock, hence X 0 1 = X 0 2 = X 0 3 = 0 and X 0 4 = . If Z 4 = (?)1 this will still be the case after the application of Z 1 to Z 4 . The left input to the MA structure is the same for X and X . The right input di ers by . This XOR propagates unchanged through the top right (TR) addition to the bottom right (BR) multiplication by Z 6 . If this is equal to (?)1, the output XOR is again . This di erence propagates unchanged through the BL addition and the XORs to the 4 subblocks. The output di erence Y 0 of the round is equal to ( ; ; ; 0). Hence if the 15 MSB of both Z 4 and Z 6 are 0, the input XOR (0; 0; 0; ) gives rise to the output XOR ( ; ; ; 0) with probability 1, denoted by (0; 0; 0; ) ) ( ; ; ; 0). A similar analysis can be made for any other of the 15 possible nonzero input XORs where only the MSB bits of the subblocks are allowed to be 1. The results are listed in Table 4 . Table 4 . XOR propagation in the round function with conditions on the subkeys.
The propagation of a given XOR for multiple rounds can be easily studied by letting the output XOR be the input XOR to the following round. The conditions on the subkeys can be read in Table 4 .
An example for the plaintext XOR (0; ; 0; ) is given in Table 5 . It can be seen that for keys with only nonzero bits on positions 26{40, 72{76 and 108{ 122 the output XOR must be equal to (0; ; ; 0). This is the largest class we found, comprising a total of 2 35 keys. Membership can be checked by performing 2 encryptions where the plaintexts have a chosen di erence and observing the di erence in the ciphertexts. A similar Table 5 . Propagation of plaintext XOR (0; ; 0; ) in IDEA.
Expanding Classes of Weak Keys
Classes of weak keys can sometimes be signi cantly expanded at the cost of some more e ort in the checking for membership. Omitting in Table 5 the conditions for the subkeys of round 8 gives rise to the class of 2 51 keys with nonzero bits on positions 26{40, 72{83 and 99{122. We will show that both checking for membership and calculation of the speci c key can be performed e ciently.
The Membership Test
The input XOR of round 8 is equal to the output XOR of round 7 and is guaranteed to be equal to (0; 0; ; ) by the conditions on the subkeys of the rst 7 rounds. Using the fact that Z (9) 3 , consisting of global key bits 54{69 is 0000 for these keys it can easily be derived that 
This can be veri ed by inspecting Fig.2 . In (4) only Z (9) 1 is unknown. This subkey consists of global key bits 22{37. For the given class only the 12 LSB may di er from 0. If the global key does not belong to the class of weak keys, the probability that (4) has a solution is 1=16. Additional encryptions can be performed to eliminate these solutions. Every pair of encryptions yields an equation for Z (9) 1 similar to (4).
The Determination of the Key
The value of the 12 unknown bits of Z (9) 1 are already determined by the membership test. The following step is the determination of the 3 unknown bits of Z (9) 2 , the 12 unknown bits of Z (9) 4 and the 7 unknown bits of Z (8) 4 . A consistency check can be executed on these bits in the following way. Suppose Z are known. In this case it is possible to calculate the di erence that is denoted by K in Fig.2 . For this value K there must be a vector A (with MSB 0) such that K = (Z (8)  4 
